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Location-Based Services and Privacy
Teresa Scassa and Anca Sattler*
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen a rapid growth in the number and variety of location-
based services that are available to consumers. While some of the older location-
based services are tools such as GPS and other navigation systems, more recent
innovations include applications that permit users to call up a variety of different
information about their current locations, such as the nearest Italian restaurant, or
the best deals at a favourite store. Location-based services (LBS) also allow indi-
viduals to share their location with friends in a wide range of social networking
contexts. Location-based services are already shifting from pull to push applica-
tions. Information can now be pushed automatically to users based on their loca-
tion. The options for such services are virtually limitless, and include mobile-mar-
keting, public transportation applications, information about local points of interest,
health care applications connected to remote treatment systems, or tools to find the
closest election-day polling booth.
There is no doubt that many location-based services offer real benefits to
users. Yet location-based services raise inevitable user privacy concerns. These
concerns operate on multiple levels and involve many players. In some applica-
tions, privacy issues will arise between individual users, where, for example, appli-
cations permit the tracking of movements of family members, co-workers or
“friends”.1 Location-based services may also result in the collection of a new layer
of personal information about consumers by private sector companies. Information
about individuals and their movements has meaningful commercial value, and the
potential for the collection, use and disclosure of this information is significant.2
* Teresa Scassa is Canada Research Chair in Information Law and Professor, University
of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section. Anca Sattler is a third year student
at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law section. This paper is part
of a broader research project generously supported by the GEOIDE Network. Thank
you to Charles Sanders for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.
1 Examples of location-based services which permit the sharing of location information
with “friends” include Google Latitude (http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/latitude/
intro.html) and Facebook Places (http://www.facebook.com/places/). Cell phone loca-
tion data can also be used to track the movements of the cell phone user, for example
tracking a teen (http://www.gpsfortoday.com/gps-tracking-for-teens/) or secretly track-
ing a spouse or an employee (http://www.whereareyougps.com/).
2 John B. Morris Jr., “The Privacy Implications of Commercial Location-Based Ser-
vices” (Statement before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 24 February
2010) at 6, online: Center for Democracy and Technology
[CDT] <http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-MorrisLocationTestimony.pdf>. Morris
notes that “the number of possible uses for location data is ever-growing and the num-
ber of companies handling location information is continuously expanding as well:
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Location-based services also raise the spectre of state surveillance of individual
activity — either concurrent with an individual’s movements (tracking), or retro-
spectively, through searching records of individual patterns of movement.3 These
are just some of the contexts in which privacy issues are raised.
In this paper we begin by describing location-based services, their evolution
and their future directions. We then outline privacy issues raised by such services.
In Part III we consider how current Canadian data protection laws apply to loca-
tion-based services, and indicate where such laws fall short of addressing the full
range of issues raised by location-based services. Part IV of the paper explores
some technological methods to address the privacy challenges raised by location-
based services. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations.
I. LOCATION-BASED SERVICES
Location-based services are proliferating largely due to the dramatic rise in the
number of GPS-equipped mobile devices used by consumers. Such devices include
smart phones, tablet computers and hand held Global Positioning Systems (GPS).
Newer versions of internet browsers are also “location aware”, facilitating the use
of location information in tailoring the user’s web experience.4 Location-based ser-
vices are premised on the sharing of a user’s location information with a set of
specified individuals within their circle of family, friends or associates. Services
such as Google Latitude,5 Glympse,6 Foursquare7 or Gowalla,8 enable this kind of
location sharing. Location-sharing can also have a non-consensual dimension. For
example, it can be used by employers to track the location of their employees,9 or
handset vendors, operating system vendors, advertisers, advertising networks, and ana-
lytics companies may also have access to precise, sensitive information about where
users are located”.
3 Cases in both the U.S. and Canada have involved law enforcement access to location
information in the hands of third party service providers. See, e.g.: R v. Plant, [1993] 3
SCR 281 [Plant]; R v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 SCR 211 [Gomboc]; Smith v.
Maryland (1979), 442 U.S. 735 (U.S. Md.) [Smith]; In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic
Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 534 F Supp 2d 585
(WD Pa 2008). These cases are discussed in greater detail below. Civil liberties groups
have expressed concerns about the ease with which law enforcement agencies might
access this data without a warrant. See CDT, supra note 2 at 3.
4 See, for example, Mozilla Firefox, Location-Aware Browsing, online:
<http://www.mozilla.com/en-GB/firefox/geolocation/>; Google, Google Chrome Be-
comes Location Aware, online:   <http://google-chrome-browser.com/google-chrome-
becomes-location-aware>.




9 National Work Rights Institute, “On Your Tracks: GPS Tracking in the Workplace”
(2010) at 10–15, online: <http://workrights.us/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/
NWI_GPS_Report.pdf>.
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by parents to track the location of their children, with or without their knowledge or
consent.10 In all cases, however, location information is explicitly shared with a
specified list of individuals.
Mobile marketing is a growing location-based activity in which location infor-
mation is used. There is also an ever-growing and ever-changing group of services
that can be delivered to individuals based on their location. For example, users
searching for a particular clothing chain’s web site might be asked for their location
information in order to provide them with more specific information about outlets
near them.11 Using location-based services, individuals may request information
about nearby tourist attractions, or the location of other services or institutions.
They may also be provided emergency and other assistance based on their loca-
tion.12 Public transit information may also be delivered in this way.13 Other types
of location-based services have emerged including those which augment the infor-
mation delivered,14 or those which combine geo-location with games.15
(a) Determining a Mobile Device’s Location
Location-based services rely upon information about a user’s location. This
information is typically gathered and communicated by mobile devices which users
10 Multiple services exist to turn GPS-enabled cell phones into tracking devices. Many of
these cite the virtues of being able to track family members. See, for example:
<http://www.accutracking.com/> or <http://www.whereareyougps.com/>.
11 Location aware browsing is available with Mozilla Firefox 3.5 and higher
<http://www.mozilla.com/en-GB/firefox/geolocation/>; Google Chrome <http://google
-chrome-browser.com/google-chrome-becomes-location-aware>; and Internet Explorer
9 <http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/internet-explorer/products/ie-9/windows-in-
ternet-explorer-9-privacy-statement>. These three most popular browsers prompt users
when a website is requesting their location information, and the user is given the option
to share or not. Location aware browsing is turned on by default in Bing. For a discus-
sion of the collection of location information from web browsers, see Amir Efrati &
Jennifer Valentino-Devries, “Computers, Too, Can Give Away
Location”, The Wall Street Journal (27 April 2011) online: <http:
//online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703778104576287401134790790.html>.
12 An example of this is the OnStar service which provides emergency and other
 support services based on the vehicle’s location. See online:
<http://www.onstar.com/web/portal/home>.
13 For example, the NextBus system offers transit arrival time predictions based on data
gathered from GPS equipped vehicles, online:
<http://www.nextbus.com/corporate/index.htm>.
14 Poynt offers a local search application with “augmented reality features” that allow
users to locate restaurants, shops or other features in their vicinity and then to obtain
layers of additional information. See online: <http://www.poynt.com>.
15 An early location-based game experience was offered by Geocaching, a form of GPS-
enabled treasure hunting <http://www.geocaching.com/>. More recent initiatives in-
clude Foursquare, which allows users to earn points by checking-in to places, and to
win badges for discovering new features. See also: Maria Ebling & Ramón Cáceres,
“Gaming and Augmented Reality Come to Location-Based Services”, IEEE CS (2010)
online: <http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/mags/pc/2010/01/mpc2010010005.pdf>.
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carry with them, or are situated in a vehicle driven by the user. The ability to com-
municate information about their location is generally crucial to the proper func-
tioning of a device. For example, a mobile phone cannot send or receive calls with-
out communicating information about its location on an ongoing basis.
Depending on the technology used, there are different ways in which a de-
vice’s location can be determined. One way to determine a device’s location relies
upon network infrastructure and different positioning technologies (such as
Wimax,16 Wi-Fi,17 UWB,18 and RFID).19 This method is used with mobile devices
without a built-in GPS, where the device’s position is estimated relative to base, or
beacon nodes.20 The process begins by estimating the distance and angle between
the device and multiple beacon nodes in its vicinity, either by the device itself, or
by the network service. The device’s position is then calculated by applying one or
more of the fundamental geometric principles of trilateration, multilateration and
triangulation.21 Distance can be calculated by studying the signals received. When
the user of the device is in motion, the direction of movement can be determined by
the angle of signal received, or by making use of motion sensors such as
accelerometers.22
Trilateration is a technique used to determine the position of a point, or a
mobile device in this case, based on a calculation of the point’s distance from three
or more known locations. This method can be contrasted with triangulation, which
involves the measurement of angles from the device’s location to three or more
beacons with known or fixed locations. Locating an object by multilateration23 en-
tails the computation of the time difference of arrival of a signal emitted from that
object to three or more receivers. One or a combination of these methods can be
used in identifying the device’s location.
Another method of determining the location of a mobile device is through the
16 WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), online:
<http://www.techpluto.com/wimax-in-detail/>.
17 Wi-Fi is a trademark of Wi-Fi Alliance. See online: <http://www.wi-fi.org
/discover_and_learn.php>.
18 UWB (UltraWide Band) is a radio technology used at low energy levels for short range
communications at high bandwidth. See Nicholas Cravotta, “Ultrawideband: The Next
Wireless Panacea?”, EDN (17 October 2002) online:
<http://www.edn.com/article/492456-
Ultrawideband_the_next_wireless_panacea_.php>.
19 RFID (Radio Frequency Identification). See “What is RFID”, RFID Journal (2005)
online: <http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1339/1/129/>.
20 Syed A. Ahson & Mohammad Ilyas, eds, Location-Based Services Handbook: Applica-
tions, Technologies, and Security, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2011) at 3 [LBS
Handbook].
21 Ibid.
22 Accelerometers are sensors built in mobile devices that can measure the tilt, orientation
and motion of a device. See MEMSIC, online:
<http://www.memsic.com/products/sensor-components/accelerometers.html>.
23 See online: <http://www.multilateration.com/surveillance/multilateration.html>.
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use of GPS,24 and assisted GPS, a technology used to augment GPS signals. This is
useful in urban areas or indoor locations where signals may be weak.25 A GPS-
enabled device can transmit the information captured from satellites through the
cellular network to the location server, which then will transmit information back to
the mobile device. GPS technology can be combined with other location technolo-
gies to produce more accurate location information.26
Laser, ultrasound and sound technologies are currently being researched to im-
prove the accuracy and to speed up the process of calculating a device’s location.27
If more than one method is available for determining location, the precision and the
quality of service provided by the location-based services are greatly improved.
This availability of methods depends largely on the technological capabilities of the
device. The current trend is towards ongoing improvements in the accuracy of loca-
tion information.
Smart phones and other such mobile devices emit location information every
few seconds. This process occurs repeatedly so that the device is always aware of
its location in relation to communication towers and the user experiences no delays
in receiving or transmitting calls. Users may be unaware that this process of com-
municating location information is rapid, regular and ongoing. It is not initiated
solely by the user’s choice to make use of the device.28
More recently, Wi-Fi access points have been used as a means of determining
a device’s location.29 Wi-Fi access points emit their location information in the
form of a Media Access Control Address (MAC address) on a continuous basis.30
Wi-Fi Positioning Systems (WPS) collect and map the location of Wi-Fi access
points. When a user uses a mobile device, the device will seek out nearby Wi-Fi
access points. The device’s location can be calculated based on those access points
visible to the device.31 In the course of this process individual devices may also be
24 Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based navigation system made up of a
network of 24 satellites placed into orbit by the U.S. Department of Defense, originally
intended for military applications (see online: <http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/>).
25 See Palenius, T. & Wigren, T., “Optimized search window alignment for A-GPS”,
(2009) 58 No 8 IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 4670.
26 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services
on smart mobile devices, adopted 16 May 2011, 881/11/EN WP 185 at 5 [Working
Party 13/2011], online: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs
/2011/wp185_en.pdf>.
27 LBS Handbook, supra note 20 at 68.
28 Charles Arthur, “Android phones record user locations according to research”, The
Guardian (21 April 2011) online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011
/apr/21/android-phones-record-user-locations>; Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani-Berlin
Heidllbergof data. See,er of Canada, Kane, “Your Apps are Watching You”, The Wall
Street Journal (17 December 2010) online: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000
1424052748704694004576020083703574602.html>.
29 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 5.
30 Ibid.
31 Anne Cavoukian & Kim Cameron, “Wi-Fi Positioning Systems: Beware of Unintended
Consequences” (Toronto: Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of On-
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identified by their own unique MAC addresses.32
(b) History and Evolution of Location-Based Service Technology
Location-based services were first introduced with Enhanced911 (E-911), an
initiative of the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to make all wire-
less phones location-capable. The goal was to enable emergency services to quickly
and accurately determine the location of a call placed using a cell phone and to
deliver the location information to the closest Public Safety Answering Point.33
Operators of mobile services began to introduce commercial location-based ser-
vices in order to gain return for their E-911 investments. These initial developments
were characterized by finder services, where information was sent to a user upon
request (e.g. finding a restaurant or a tourist attraction).34 Because of poor design,
limited precision and reduced functionality, these services failed to gain in
popularity.
Significant changes in location-based service technologies were made possible
by the development of low powered GPS-enabled mobile phones and assisted GPS,
as well as the introduction of the 3G broadband wireless services.35 Better location-
based services, such as real-time mapping, points-of-interest content or navigation
support, could be offered with the advent of new GPS-enabled mobile phones and
devices, which support high accuracy positioning.36 These improvements led to the
next generation of location-based services, which facilitated the delivery of mun-
dane services at the push of a button (i.e. calling a taxi to the user’s location with-
out dialling a service operator), or allowed a user’s location to trigger the sending
of information to the mobile device.
One of the reasons why location-based services have gained in popularity is
the shift from a reactive to a proactive system. While a reactive system simply
responds to a user’s location, a proactive system allows users to register their inter-
ests and/or preferences. Based on this information, the proactive system will auto-
matically push relevant content to the user. In a location-based system, this might
include notifying users when they are approaching points of interest.37 These
proactive systems require less input from the user, yet deliver a wide range of infor-
mation. These systems require a constant tracking of the mobile device to enable an
tario, June 2011), online: <http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/wi-fi.pdf>; Work-
ing Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 6.
32 Cavoukian & Cameron, supra note 31 at 10.
33 Federal Communications Commission News, “FCC Adopts Wireless 911 Rules” (13
May 1999) [FCC], online: <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_
Releases/1999/nrwl9016.html>.
34 M. A. Labrador, K. Michael & A. Kupper, “Advanced location-based services” (2008)
University of Wollongong Research Online at 1, online:<http:
//ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/584>.
35 Paolo Bellavista, Axel Küpper & Sumi Hela, “Location-Based Services: Back to the
Future” (2008) 7:2 Pervasive Computing, IEEE CS 85 at 85.
36 Labrador, supra note 34 at 1.
37 Bellavista, supra note 35 at 86.
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efficient supply of information.38
Another recent development is the emergence of cross-referencing services,
where the user and the target for information are not always the same. This service
takes information from one user in order to serve another.39 For example, in May
2011, it was reported that TomTom, a manufacturer of portable satellite navigation
systems, was selling anonymized data collected from its high-end navigation de-
vices to authorities throughout Europe, U.S. and Canada, to be used for traffic con-
trol purposes.40
The multifunctional nature of GPS-equipped smart phones adds to the com-
plexity of location information capable of being shared. This includes cell phone
camera functions that geo-tag photographs.41 Accelerometers, a type of sensor that
is increasingly common in mobile devices, are capable of measuring acceleration,
tilt and orientation, and thus have the potential to increase the fine detail of the
location information that is being gathered.42 Transportation systems can also make
use of and gather data from GPS-enabled mobile phones on board vehicles in order
to estimate the traffic flow on roads and highways.43 Location-based services con-
tinue to evolve as new technological capabilities become widely available and
highly affordable. One example is the availability of location-sensitive billing ser-
vices, where certain service providers can automatically charge a user when using
their service, such as road tolls.44
Research is being conducted on applications with augmented reality features,
which would enable a mobile phone equipped with a camera, a compass and a GPS
38 Ibid at 86.
39 Ibid.
40 TomTom has admitted and apologized for selling drivers’ GPS data to authorities. The
Dutch authorities have used the GPS data to build better speed bumps and position
speed cameras more efficiently. In Ontario, GPS data acquired from TomTom was
used by authorities to optimize evacuation routes for the city of Toronto. See “Tom-




42 Supra note 22.
43 See Daniel B. Work et al, “Lagrangian Sensing: Traffic Estimation with Mobile De-
vices”, online: <https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/dbwork/www/pdf/ACC09.pdf>. See also S.
Amin et al, “Mobile century-using GPS mobile phones as traffic sensors: a field experi-
ment” in 15th World Congress on ITS (New York, NY: Intelligent Transport Systems,
17–20 November 2008).
44 See Stefan Steiniger, Moritz Neun & Alistair Edwardes, “Foundations of Location-
Based Services” University of Zurich at 26, online: Project CartouCHe
<http://www.spatial.cs.umn.edu/Courses/Fall07/8715/papers/IM7_steiniger.pdf>. The
toll system differs from the already popular RFID chips embedded in vehicles, because
this system can calculate the actual distance travelled by the vehicle on the toll high-
way and can charge the user based on the distance. (See for example Toll-Collect ser-
vice in Germany, online: <www.toll-collect.de>.) This ensures that traffic flow is not
disrupted as vehicles are not required to stop and pay at a booth upon exiting the
highway.
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to superimpose information about points of interest on a live camera view, based on
the phone’s current position, orientation and the direction in which the camera is
pointing.45 In its May 16, 2011 report, the EU Data Protection Working Party on
Geolocation Services expressed a sense of urgency in addressing data protection in
the context of mobile technologies because of the proliferation of mobile devices
and the rapid advancement of the technology.46
(c) Positive Uses of Location-Based Services
The potential for the development of location-based services is virtually limit-
less and may extend into every sphere of human endeavour. An obvious benefit
brought by location-based services is the ability to filter vast amounts of content
available over the Internet, and to deliver to the user only information in which she
may have an interest.47 For example, a simple query for a pharmacy would not
return all registered pharmacies for the user to sift through until she finds the phar-
macy closest to her location. The location-based service would return information
related to only those pharmacies in the user’s immediate vicinity.
Location-based services also serve the user by pushing information to her,
such as discounts or coupons as she passes by a department store, alerts of risks
when entering a high-crime district, or warnings before encountering a traffic jam
on the highway.48 Furthermore, by sharing location information, all users benefit
from more current localized information. Mobile devices connected to location-
based services can also assist in finding missing persons.
Location awareness may also permit a variety of health and emergency man-
agement benefits. For example, the Virtual Blood Bank Project in Delhi, India uses
smart phones to build a pervasive network capable of giving users instantaneous
information about available blood donors in their vicinity, which may be critical in
emergency situations.49 Other health care applications may include the ability to
transmit critical health related information to a hospital along with the patient’s
location and estimated time of arrival to the emergency room, allowing the hospital
45 Metro Paris Subway: <http://www.metroparisiphone.com/index_en.html>.
46 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26.
47 Sidney Shek, “Next-Generation Location-Based Services For Mobile Devices” CSC
(February 2010) at 1, online: <http://assets1.csc.com/lef/downloads/CSC_Grant_2010_
Next_Generation_Location_Based_Services_for_Mobile_Devices.pdf>.
48 Ibid.
49 Indian citizens register as donors or recipients on Web sites created for these purposes.
They specify their blood type and contact information. A server matches the blood type
needed and the location by a recipient with the donors in close proximity, and sends
this information to the recipient. Concerns have been raised about the disclosure of
personal information about the donors. See Muhammad Sajidur Rahman et al, “Smart
Blood Query: A Novel Mobile Phone Based Privacy-aware Blood Donor Recruitment
and Management System for Developing Regions”, Advanced Information Networking
and Applications (AINA), 2011 IEEE Workshops of International Conference (22–25
March 2011) at 544–548.
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to make all necessary preparations before the patient’s arrival.50
II. PRIVACY CONCERNS AND RISKS
There is no doubt that the explosive development of location-based applica-
tions presents a whole new series of privacy concerns and risks for its users. The
use of GPS-enabled hand-held devices has become ubiquitous. Such devices in-
clude smart phones, PDAs, and tablet computers. In this section we first discuss
consumer attitudes towards geolocation privacy before providing an overview of
some of the privacy concerns raised by the use of these technologies.
All identified risks involve the fact that either the location information itself,
or a combination of location information with other information, has the potential
to reveal excessive amounts of personally identifiable information about individu-
als. As noted by the EU Data Protection Working Party in its recent opinion on
geolocation services, “[a]ll kinds of information can be connected to a geographic
location, such as financial data, health data and other consumer behavioural
data.”51 This information can include details that the individual had no intention of
sharing. The phenomenon of data profiling adds to the privacy risk, as it is increas-
ingly the case that personal information from a wide variety of sources is combined
in profiles of a disturbing level of detail.52
(a) Concerns and Consumer Attitudes
Canadians are fairly careful about sharing their location information. A 2009
survey commissioned by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada53
found that 90 per cent of Canadians are concerned about the impact new technol-
ogy has upon their lives.54 The same report indicates that an overall majority of
Canadians (98%) find strong privacy laws to be important. Although Canadians
may not be aware of all privacy risks associated with revealing their location infor-
mation, the EKOS study found that Canadians tend to have high expectations of
50 See Ahn, J. et al, “A Study on the Application of Patient Location Data for Ubiquitous
Healthcare System based on LBS” (2008) IEEE 10th International Conference on Ad-
vanced Communication Technology at 2140–2143, online:
<http://www.iaeng.org/publication/WCE2008/WCE2008_pp270-273.pdf>.
51 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 3.
52 See, e.g., Jason Millar, “Core Privacy: A Problem for Predictive Data Mining” in Ian
Kerr et al, eds, Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a
Networked Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 103.
53 EKOS Research Associates Inc. Canadians and Privacy, Final Report (March 2009)
online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/survey/2009/ekos_2009_01_e.cfm#sec1>.
54 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “DRAFT: Report on the 2010 Office
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Consultations on Online Tracking, Profiling
and Targeting and Cloud Computing” online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/
consultations/report_2010_e.pdf>. Numerous mobile device applications entice users
to disclose their location information without much concern for privacy, even when
such information is not needed to perform the service. See John Krumm, “A Survey of
Computational Location Privacy” (Redmond, WA; Microsoft Research, 2009) at 392
[Krumm].
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privacy. This extends to online activities. They worry about disclosing too much
information, especially if data is shared with services outside of Canada.55 The
FTC in the U.S. has similarly observed that “notwithstanding consumers’ lack of
understanding about how companies collect and use consumer data, consumers care
about their privacy.”56
The FTC Privacy Framework document identifies consumer awareness as a
key factor in dealing with privacy issues. In other words, where consumers are
aware of privacy risks, and of effective means to address them, they will take such
steps.57 However the investment of time and effort required of consumers in order
to protect their privacy may dampen their willingness to take these steps.58 This
suggests that clear and accessible information, as well as effective and efficient
privacy tools are important components of appropriate privacy protection. In the
Canadian context this may mean that data protection laws should be interpreted so
as to place a greater onus on companies to ensure that privacy policies and privacy
options are made available to consumers in accessible and user-friendly ways.59
The context in which location information is requested is directly connected
with the users’ willingness to share their location information.60 Canadians are less
comfortable sharing their location information when their location is being dis-
closed in real-time, and when they have no control over who has access to this
information.61 A Natural Resources Canada survey on privacy and the use of geos-
patial information found that approximately half of respondents could not see any
benefits provided by location-tracking technology.62 The same survey indicated
that respondents were most comfortable with location tracking where they per-
ceived a compelling benefit such as personal safety or improved emergency
services.63
An ever-increasing number of children and teenagers use mobile devices capa-
ble of gathering and sharing location information. Individuals belonging to this age
category seem least concerned with risks associated with disclosure of such infor-
55 Ibid.
56 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of
Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policy Makers, Preliminary




59 For example, in PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-010, [2009] CPCSF No 10, the Assis-
tant Privacy Commissioner found that where the relevant information had to be culled
from FAQs, the service agreement and a web page providing network management
information, notice to consumers was not sufficiently transparent to meet the require-
ments of the law.
60 Research related to privacy and the use of geospatial information, Natural Resources




63 Ibid at 56.
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mation and they may not be fully aware of the implications and consequences of
their actions.64 The Federal Trade Commission in the United States recognized the
weakness of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)65 in contexts
where teenagers provide inaccurate information about their age in order to obtain
access to otherwise restricted online services. For example, a recent study showed
that millions of Facebook users were under the age of 13.66
(b) Risks
There are several privacy risks associated with the use of location-enabled de-
vices and location-based services. In this section, we discuss and highlight some of
these risks. We divide these into three categories: information-sharing by users,
data profiling, and information sharing with law enforcement.
(i) Information Sharing by Users
Many applications now exist which permit users to share their location with
others.67 Typically, these “others” are selected by the person who chooses to dis-
close his or her information. For example, a user might identify certain friends or
family members who can access her location information. However, in some cases,
this ability to choose may be overridden by default settings.68 For example,
Facebook’s “Places” application will automatically share one’s location informa-
tion with all of one’s friends after one has checked-in to a place unless this feature
is turned off by the user.69 Given that many people have a large number of
“friends”, a general default of this nature raises the risk that location information
64 “Protecting Youths in an Online World”, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Con-
sumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance Committee On Commerce, Science,
And Transportation United States Senate, 111th Cong. (15 July 2010) online:
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/100715toopatestimony.pdf>.
65 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 USC §6501-6506 (1998), Pub L
No 105-277, [COPPA].
66 Wailin Wong, “Millions of underage kids use Facebook, Consumer Reports says”,
Chicago Tribune (10 May 2011) online: <http://www.chicagotribune.com/business
/breaking/chibrkbus-millions-of-kids-under-age-13-use-facebook-consumer-reports-
says-20110509,0,4123052.story>.
67 Popular examples include Google Latitude, Foursquare, Facebook Places, and
Gowalla. Supra notes 5, 7 and 8.
68 Facebook claims that, for “most people”, check-ins are set by default to share location
information with the user’s Facebook friends only. A video
(https://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=10150265360030484) released by
Facebook in connection with default sharing with “Places”, explains how person A can
be tagged by another person B using Places, thus immediately revealing person A’s
whereabouts. Another default sharing set to “enabled” is for “Friends can check me
into places”. Therefore, if person A is not aware of person B using Facebook Places
and she did not change her default Facebook settings, person A’s location information
can become public unbeknownst to her.
69 For more information and related sites see Facebook Places and Privacy” EPIC.org,
online: <http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/places/>.
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will be inadvertently disclosed to persons with whom one would prefer not to
share. Similarly, Foursquare, the popular location-based social networking site, de-
faults to sharing the location and time of each of the user’s check-ins with “friends”
and with the Foursquare website. Through its “who’s here” feature, it goes a step
further, defaulting to share the information of users in that specific location with
anybody, not just with friends.70 The disclosure of location information to a broad
range of persons without the awareness of the data subject creates a range of differ-
ent privacy risks. Not only do individuals become vulnerable to stalking or other
unsought contact, but the location information may result in information about sen-
sitive activities (visits to medical clinics or political gatherings, for example) being
inadvertently shared with others.71 Location-sharing by minors raises its own seri-
ous privacy and security concerns.
The ability to control who may access one’s location information is often
touted as a privacy protective feature. However, even where a user is aware of and
exercises these controls there may still be risks. These include the risk that a
“friend” will share the user’s location information with someone who the user does
not wish to have it (such as an ex-lover, for example). Information may also fall
into the hands of others when a device is lost, loaned or stolen. Further, not all uses
of location features are necessarily consensual. There have been concerns raised
about employers who provide employees with location-enabled smart phones or
other devices without informing the employee that tracking features are enabled.72
When families share cell phone plans, the main subscriber may be able to access
location information relating to all other phones in the plan.73 Concerns have been
repeatedly raised about the risks posed by location-enabled devices to women seek-
ing to leave abusive partners.74 Recent news reports indicate that the iPhone 4
backed up and stored detailed location information on users’ computer hard-drives
70 See Foursquare sharing default settings, online: <http://foursquare.com/privacy/grid>.
71 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 7.
72 National Work Rights Institute, “On Your Tracks: GPS Tracking in the Workplace”,
(2010) online: <http://workrights.us/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/NWI_GPS
_Report.pdf>. Parents can also use similar features to track their children with or with-
out the child’s knowledge.
73 Annys Shin, “Maryland family helps to catch a thief using cell phone’s GPS
technology”, The Washington Post (27 October 2010) online: <http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/201010/27/AR201010270
8080.html?hpid=topnews>. Services such as Sprint Family Locator, for example, ex-
plicitly permit subscribers to sign up to track the location of family members; see on-
line: <https://sfl.sprintpcs.com/finder-sprint-family/signIn.htm>.
74 See, e.g., Justin Scheck, “Stalkers Exploit Cellphone GPS”, Wall Street Journal (3
August 2010) online: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575
383522318244234.html>; Andrew Wentzell, “Cell Phone Tracking: The Use of GPS
Technology in Stalking” (November 2010) 3:2 Domestic Violence Review, online:
<http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/family/bin/Domestic%20Violence%20Review
%20Vol%20III%20Issue%201.pdf>.
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without notice or consent.75 This data would be available to anyone who had access
to the computer or device and who knew where to look.
Even in cases where users consent to a certain amount of information sharing,
they may have an imperfect sense of how an analysis of such data might be used to
draw certain inferences. In some cases, location information may be shared inad-
vertently. Users may simply forget that they have enabled the sharing of location
information, or they may be unaware that such information is being shared. Not all
users of digital camera equipment, for example, are aware that photographs they
take may contain geo-referenced information.76 It has been demonstrated that indi-
viduals who post geo-tagged photographs or other geo-referenced information may
permit inferences to be drawn about the location of their home or workplace.77
The use of location-enabled devices, such as smart phones and tablet com-
puters may also result in the collection, use and disclosure of location information
for purposes not directly related to the delivery of any particular location-based
service. For example, in April 2011, Apple Computers became embroiled in con-
troversy after reports surfaced that the iPhone 4 collects and stores detailed location
information about users on their phones and other devices synched with the
phone.78 While the location information may have been necessary to deliver mobile
communication services, the longer term storage of the information was not neces-
sary to the provision of the service. Issues have also arisen with respect to applica-
tions that have no location-based functions (for example, simple games for hand-
held devices), but that nevertheless harvest location information from the mobile
device to which they are downloaded.79
75 Charles Arthur, “iPhone 4 keeps record of everywhere you go”, The Guardian (20
April 2011) online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/20/iphone-track-
ing-prompts-privacy-fears> [Arthur “iphone”].
76 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, “Geotag, You’re It! What your Smartphone might be
saying behind your back” (18 October 2010) online: <http://www.
privacyrights.org/geotagging-privacy>. The web site “I Can Stalk You” offers consum-
ers help in how to protect their privacy through controlling geotagging; see online:
<http://icanstalku.com/>.
77 Kazuhiro Minami & Nikita Borisov, “Protecting Location Privacy against Inference
Attacks” (2010) WPES ’10 Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy
in the electronic society; A. Gallagher et al, “Geo-location inference from image con-
tent and user tags”, 2009 IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition Workshops. For more scenarios raising privacy concern see G.
Friedland & R. Sommer, “Cybercasing the Joint: On the Privacy Implications of Geo-
Tagging” Proceedings of the Fifth USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security,
(Washington, D.C., August 2010) online: <http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs
/networking/cybercasinghotsec10.pdf> at 4 [Friendland].
78 Arthur “iphone”, supra note 75.
79 “Smartphone apps harvest, spread personal information”, Science Newsline (29
September 2010) online: <http://www.sciencenewsline.com/technology/2010092
912000036.html>. The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT, supra note 2)
notes that as of July 2009 there were 3300 location-based apps available at app stores
for mobile devices. See also Thurm & Kane, supra note 28.
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(ii) Data Profiling
The EU Working Party on geolocation services noted that mobile devices tend
to be very closely associated with specific individuals. Thus the location informa-
tion collected and/or shared via such devices can be highly revelatory of those indi-
viduals’ movements and activities.80 The information will also reveal patterns of
activity and inactivity, permitting further inferences to be drawn.81 For example,
the information might reveal that they spend more time than they should in bars, or
that they have made frequent visits to a clinic or hospital. The report notes that
“[t]his allows the provider of geolocation-based services to gain an intimate over-
view of habits and patterns of the owner of such a device and build extensive
profiles.”82
The providers of location-based services or related services (such as the mo-
bile device itself or the telecommunications service provider) are often in a position
to track or record the movements of their users with high spatial and temporal fidel-
ity.83 As a result they may generate a complete history of each user’s movements,
including the type of location-based services they accessed and the time of ac-
cess.84 The fact that records with this kind of detail can be created does not mean
that they necessarily will be. However, it is clear that fine-grained personal infor-
mation of this kind has a commercial value.85 There is also a track record of com-
panies retaining information for as long as possible with a view to potential future
commercial exploitation of the information.86
One of the ways in which such information may be exploited is through data
profiling. Data profiling of consumers is already a major industry,87 and there is no
doubt that the more detailed and fine-grained the data, the greater will be its com-
mercial utility. Information about location, movements, patterns of activity and so
forth could be valuable components of any data profile.88 Further, information can
be inferred about a person based on their patterns of movement even when they act
anonymously.89 A location-based service can build a chronological record over
time based on the data transmitted, thus enabling a link from the records to the
80 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 7.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Shek, supra note 47. See also Arthur “iphone”, supra note 75 for recent developments
regarding Apple iPhone 4.
84 Egemen Tanin, Rui Zhang & Lars Kulik, “Spatio-Temporal Database Research at the
University of Melbourne” (September 2009) 38:3 SIGMOD Record.
85 Millar, supra note 52 at 104-105. The Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 7,
identifies function creep as one of the privacy risks associated with location
information.
86 Daniel J., The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, (New
York: New York University Press, 2004) at 22–26.
87 Ibid at Chapter 2.
88 Shek, supra note 47.
89 Krumm, supra note 54.
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actual user.90 Geographic location or place can be a powerful identifier.91
(iii) Information-sharing with Law Enforcement
Location information gathered by private sector companies may also raise
constitutional privacy concerns where such data is sought by law enforcement or
national security officials. Although police typically need warrants to use tracking
devices linked to individuals, permissive provisions in the Criminal Code92 and in
data protection legislation raise the possibility that such data may be sought from
private sector companies without judicial authorization.93 The greater the volume
and detail of such information, the greater is the risk to individuals that this infor-
mation may be used by authorities to profile, investigate or monitor their activities.
Collectively, the widespread collection, use and disclosure of location infor-
mation raises significant privacy concerns. The existence of this data will inevita-
bly add additional layers to already existing data profiles. The harms that flow from
this form of profiling include discrimination, loss of autonomy, dignity and iden-
tity.94 In addition, the technologies incorporate a kind of self-imposed surveillance
wherein each citizen carries around the means by which their activities can be
monitored and tracked.
90 Hasan, C. S., Ahamed, S. I., & Tanviruzzaman, M., “A Privacy Enhancing Approach
for Identity Inference Protection in Location-Based Services” 33rd Annual IEEE Inter-
national Computer Software and Applications Conference (Seattle, 2009) at 1–10
[Hasan et al]; Claudio Bettini, X. Sean Wang & Sushil Jajodia, “Protecting Privacy
Against Location-based Personal Identification” Secure Data Management, LNCS
3674 (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2005) 185 [Bettini, “Protecting Privacy”].
91 See generally, T. Scassa “When is Geographic Information Personal Information?”
(2010) 10:2 OUCLJ 185. See also: Khaled El Emam et al, “Evaluating Predictors of
Geographic Area Population Size Cutoffs to Manage Re-Identificaiton Risk” (2009)
16:2 JAMIA 256; Mei-Po Kwan, “Protection of Geoprivacy and Accuracy of Spatial
Information: How Effective are Geographical Masks?” (2004) 39:2 Cartographica 15.
92 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
93 For example, s. 487.014 of the Criminal Code permits peace officers to ask persons to
volunteer information that they are not otherwise prohibited by law from disclosing.
Section 7(3)(c.1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPEDA] similarly permits disclosure of information without con-
sent by organizations “to a government institution or part of a government institution
that has made a request for the information, identified its lawful authority to obtain the
information and indicated that” the information is required for the purposes of law en-
forcement, national security or the administration of a law of Canada or a province.
Provisions with similar effect are found in British Columbia’s Personal Information
Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5 [PIPA (B.C.)], s. 18(j), and
Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5 [PIPA (Alberta)], s.
20(f).
94 See, for example, Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Coming to Terms with Chance: Engaging Ra-
tional Discrimination and Cumulative Disadvantage, (Ashgate, 2009); and Solove,
supra note 86 at 47-48.
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III. PRIVACY LAW AND LOCATION INFORMATION
Data protection legislation can place limits on the collection, use or disclosure
of personal information and these limits may be instrumental in protecting the pri-
vacy of personal information. In this part of the paper, we begin with a discussion
of data protection legislation in Canada. We consider the particular challenges
posed by location-information for data protection regimes. We then address the
broader privacy risks posed by location information, even where its collection, use
or disclosure is carried out in a manner compliant with data protection norms.
(a) Data Protection and Location Information
In Canada, private sector data protection legislation sets a normative frame-
work for the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. The federal
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) applies
to all inter-provincial collection, use and disclosure of personal information in the
course of commercial activity, to the collection, use and disclosure of personal in-
formation by federal works and undertakings, and to intra-provincial activity where
a province has not enacted substantially similar legislation.95 Only Quebec, Alberta
and British Columbia currently have general private sector data protection statutes
that have been declared substantially similar.96 In those three provinces, the appli-
cable statute depends upon the nature of the activity at issue. In the context of loca-
tion-based services, telecommunications operations will be subject to the federal
legislation as they are federally-regulated undertakings. Some ISPs will fall under
provincial law in Quebec, Alberta or British Columbia, while others may be gov-
erned by PIPEDA. Similarly, applications and location-based services that operate
interprovincially will be subject to PIPEDA. A location-based service that is of-
fered and that operates solely within one of the provinces with substantially similar
legislation will likely be subject to the provincial legislation. The statutes are nor-
matively quite similar, although there are significant differences at the level of en-
forcement and data security breach notification.
All of the private sector data protection statutes apply to the collection, use
and disclosure of “personal information”, and the definitions of personal informa-
tion all centre on “information about an identifiable individual”.97 In the case of
95 PIPEDA, supra note 93, s. 4(1) and s. 26(2)(b).
96 In Quebec, An Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sec-
tor, R.S.Q. c. P-39.1 was declared substantially similar by Organizations in the Prov-
ince of Quebec Exemption Order, SOR/2003-374 (19 November 2003). Note that this
statute predates PIPEDA. In Alberta, the Personal Information Protection Act (Al-
berta), supra note 93, was declared substantially similar by Organizations in the Prov-
ince of Alberta Exemption Order, SOR/2004-219 (12 October, 2004). In British Co-
lombia, the Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c. 63 was declared
substantially similar by Organizations in the Province of British Columbia Exemption
Order, SOR/2004-220 (12 October 2004).
97 PIPEDA, supra note 93, s. 2, definition of “personal information”; PIPA (B.C.), supra
note 93, s. 1, definition of “personal information”; PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93, s. 1,
definition of “personal information”. The comparable Quebec legislation, supra note
96, uses slightly different wording, and provides, in s. 2, that “Personal information is
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location information that tracks the movements of a mobile device, it might con-
ceivably be argued that the information reveals the location of the device, but not
necessarily the location of a specific individual, since the device might be shared or
used by others. Nevertheless, as the EU Working Party notes, although mobile de-
vices may be used by different people, such sharing is rare, and a “smart mobile
device is very intimately linked to a specific individual.”98 Information on or about
the devices should thus be considered “information about an identifiable
individual.”99
Specific pieces of information need not themselves disclose the identity of a
particular individual to qualify as personal information, so long as it is reasonably
possible to link that information to an identifiable individual.100 Anonymized loca-
tion information may still be personal information, if a company retains the means
to link that information to specific individuals.101 Further, if it is possible to iden-
tify an individual by examining patterns of movement and activity (for example, by
drawing inferences about the location of the individual’s home and workplace),
then the information will constitute information about an identifiable individual.102
Increasingly, data profiling activities result in the compilation of vast collections of
any information which relates to a natural person and allows that person to be
identified”.
98 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 7. See also Article 29 Data Protection Work-
ing Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data (20 June 2007)
01248/07/EN WP 136, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/
wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf>.
99 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 10. Note that in PIPEDA Case Summary
#351 — Use of personal information collected by Global Positioning System consid-
ered, online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2006/351_20061109_e.cfm>, the Assistant
Privacy Commissioner found that tracking information from a GPS equipped vehicle
was the personal information of the employee who drove that vehicle, because they
could be specifically linked to it. The U.S. FTC also recommends applying its Privacy
Framework to Information that can be linked to a specific device, and not just a spe-
cific individual: see Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56.
100 See Teresa Scassa, “Geographic Information as Personal Information”, (2010) 10:2
OUCLJ 185-214; Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 FC 258, 324 F.T.R. 94,
and Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, [2002] O.J. No. 4300, 166 O.A.C. 88, (sub
nom. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Freedom of Information & Protection of
Privacy Act Adjudicator)) 22 C.P.R. (4th) 447 (Ont. C.A.); affirming Ontario (Attorney
General) v. Ontario (Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act Adjudica-
tor), 16 C.P.R. (4th) 460 (Ont. Div. Ct.), (sub nom. Ontario (Attorney General)) [2001]
O.J. No. 4987, and Order P-230 (6 May 1991). The linking of de-identified information
with other information so as to identify specific individuals can be surprisingly easy,
given contemporary computing power and the vast array of public sources of data. See
Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 106.
101 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 9. The FTC notes that the Unique Device
Identifier in a mobile device can be combined with location information. When both
sets of information are supplied to a third party mobile application provider, a specific
user’s location or activities can be revealed. See Preliminary FTC Report, supra note
56 at 36-37.
102 Ibid at 10.
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atomized data particles into profiles that are effectively about identifiable individu-
als. The FTC observes that such practices blur the lines between what is personal
information and what is non-personal information.103
PIPEDA applies specifically and only to personal information that is collected,
used or disclosed in the course of commercial activity.104 Mobile service providers
are obviously engaged in commercial activity, whether it is telecommunication ser-
vices or location-based services. Mobile device manufacturers and sellers are also
engaged in commercial activity. Where apps are sold as through an interface like
Apple’s app store, the app developer is engaged in commercial activity. An app that
is provided free of charge is in more of a grey area, although if the app collects
personal information for the purposes of selling this data or using it in other com-
mercial undertakings, this will no doubt be considered a collection in the course of
commercial activity. Online businesses that offer “free” services, yet profit from
the sale of advertising on their sites or that harvest and sell user data are engaged in
commercial activity.105
The sharing of information between peers or “friends”, however, does not im-
plicate those peers in commercial activity (although the social networking service
that also collects this information is engaged in commercial activity). Thus,
PIPEDA would not apply to individuals who collect, use or disclose information
about one or more of their social networking friends for their own purposes.106 The
B.C. and Alberta statutes also contain exceptions related to the collection, use or
disclosure of personal information carried out for purely private purposes.107
Similar to its counterparts, PIPEDA is structured around 10 core normative
principles. The first of these is accountability, and it requires that organizations that
engage in the collection, use or disclosure of personal information clearly designate
a person responsible for data protection compliance, and develop appropriate poli-
cies and practices.108 They must also train staff and develop procedures with a
103 Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 36.
104 PIPEDA, supra note 93 s. 2, applies only to information that is collected, used, or
disclosed in the course of “commercial activity,” which is defined in the Act as “any
particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a com-
mercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor, membership or
other fundraising lists”.
105 For example, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada accepted that
Facebook was engaged in commercial activity, even though its services are free to con-
sumers, when it proceeded with its inquiry into the activities of that company; see
PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-008, Report of Findings into the Complaint Filed by
the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) against Facebook Inc.
Under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, online:
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.pdf> [Facebook Complaint].
106 For example, PIPEDA, supra note 93, s. 4(2)(b) provides that its provisions do not
apply to “any individual in respect of personal information that the individual collects,
uses or discloses for personal or domestic purposes and does not collect, use or disclose
for any other purpose”. Similar exceptions can be found in PIPA (B.C.), s. 3(2)(a) and
PIPA (Alberta) s. 4(3)(a).
107 PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93, s. 3(a); PIPA (B.C.), supra note 93, s. 3(a).
108 PIPEDA, supra note 93, Schedule I, principle 4.1.
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view to protecting data privacy. The second principle requires organizations to
identify the purposes for which they are collecting personal information at or
before the point in time when that information is collected.109 This is a notice re-
quirement, and service providers and developers must find ways to give adequate
notice to consumers not just of the fact that personal information is being collected,
but also of the purposes for the collection. Adequate notice has been a recurring
issue with location-based services.
Like other online services, location-based services may use default settings as
a means of simplifying the process of initiating the service. Nevertheless, default
settings may not give users the appropriate degree of notice. In her discussion of
default privacy settings in a complaint brought against Facebook, the Assistant Pri-
vacy Commissioner of Canada expressed the view that it might be appropriate to
use default settings that would facilitate the registration process for the site, “pro-
vided that the default settings are reasonable and the users properly informed of
them.”110 The Assistant Commissioner found that some of the Facebook default
settings were not reasonable, and she further found that Facebook had not done all
that it should to inform users about the defaults. She wrote: “On the registration
pages, there is no direct link to the privacy settings and no upfront message about
these settings and the fact that they have been preselected by Facebook and can be
changed.”111
Notice has also been an issue in the location-based services field, where there
have been a number of instances of apps that collect personal information with no
notice to consumers. Some of these have not even been apps where the need to
collect personal information about location is evident.112 The problem is com-
pounded by the trans-border nature of this industry. Apps developed in a jurisdic-
tion with few data protection restrictions, such as the U.S., may be available to
Canadian users through online downloads, even if they are not compliant with Ca-
nadian data protection norms.
Consent is a cornerstone principle in data protection legislation; essentially the
legitimation of the collection, use and disclosure of personal information is pre-
mised upon the data subject’s consent to these activities. In reality, consent require-
ments have proven problematic. In some cases, “opt-out” forms of consent have
been used, where consumers must check a box or otherwise indicate their with-
drawal of consent to information collection and/or sharing.113 Where the opt-out
option is buried in a privacy policy, or is part of default settings, this may diminish
109 PIPEDA, supra note 93 Schedule I, principle 4.2.
110 Facebook Complaint, supra note 105 at para. 89.
111 Ibid at para. 96.
112 Thurm & Kane, supra note 28.
113 PIPEDA, supra note 93 Schedule 1, clause 4.3.7 permits opt out consent in specific
circumstances. In PIPEDA Case Summary #2002-42 (Update), online:
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2002/cf-dc_020320_e.cfm>, the Privacy Commissioner
linked the sensitivity of the information at issue to the question of whether “opt-out”
was an appropriate means by which to seek consent. See discussion of this case by Lisa
M. Austin, “Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada’s Experi-
ence under PIPEDA”, (2006) 56 UTLJ 181 at 207-208.
118   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [9 C.J.L.T.]
the credibility of any consent.114 Some case law suggests that opt-out consent is
appropriate only with information of a very low level of sensitivity.115 This would
not include location information, which should generally be considered highly sen-
sitive,116 particularly where it reveals patterns of activity.
Consent can also be problematic where it is difficult for an ordinary consumer
to grasp the full implications of their consent to collection, use or disclosure of
personal information. In the U.S., the FTC notes that it is a significant concern that
consumers are unable to make informed choices due to a lack of understanding of
data collection and use practices.117 It is interesting to note that Bill C-29118 would
have added a new section 6.1 to PIPEDA, which would have read: “For the pur-
poses of clauses 4.3 to 4.3.8 of Schedule 1, the consent of an individual is only
valid if it is reasonable to expect that the individual understands the nature, pur-
pose and consequences of the collection, use or disclosure of personal information
to which they are consenting.”119 This would have marked a significant change,
placing a much greater onus on organizations to clarify the consequences to the
individual of the collection, use or disclosure of their personal information. The
amended consent provision might also have enhanced obligations to ensure that the
terms of consent are drafted in an accessible manner that is appropriate to the clien-
tele for the service.120 It remains to be seen whether a comparable provision will be
part of the next PIPEDA reform bill to be introduced in Parliament.
Consent must be specific to the identified purposes for collection of informa-
tion. In other words, the consent must be for those purposes, and not for some
broader, more general form of activity. Where new purposes are introduced, new
notice must be given and a fresh consent obtained.121 In its Opinion on geolocation
services, the EU Working Party also recommended that service providers should
seek renewal of consents periodically, where services are used on an ongoing
basis.122
While consent must in most cases be explicitly given, implied consent may be
114 Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 60.
115 PIPEDA, supra note 93, Schedule 1, clause 4.3.6. See: PIPEDA Case Summary #2003-
203 (5 August 2003), online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2003/cf-
dc_030805_01_e.cfm>; Case Summary #2003-192 (23 July 2003), online;
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2003/cf-dc_030723_01_e.cfm>.
116 See, e.g., Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 14. The Working Party also notes
that opt out consent is not appropriate.
117 Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 25.
118 Bill C-29, An Act to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
ments Act, 3d Sess, 40th Parl, 2010. This PIPEDA reform Bill died on the order paper
prior to the May 2, 2011 federal election. At the time of writing it is unclear if it will be
reintroduced, and if so, whether it will be identical to the previous bill.
119 Ibid [emphasis added].
120 The Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 18, notes that service providers should
not presume a technically sophisticated clientele.
121 PIPEDA, supra note 93, Schedule 1, clause 4.3.1. See also Working Party 13/2011,
supra note 26 at 15.
122 Ibid at 15-16.
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appropriate in some circumstances. PIPEDA provides that implied consent will typ-
ically only be appropriate with information that is considered to be of a less sensi-
tive character,123 which would not include location information. However, implied
consent may also be considered acceptable where “at the time the consent is
deemed to be given, the purpose would be considered to be obvious to a reasonable
person.”124 The location of an individual might be considered information that is
obviously required for the delivery of mobile services that the user has requested.
This might include, for example, where the user requests a list of restaurants close
to their location, or where they have subscribed to the delivery of mobile telecom-
munications services generally. However, it will be less obvious to a reasonable
person that their location information must be collected, used or disclosed to de-
liver to services that they did not specifically ask to receive, such as unsolicited
mobile marketing information.
Certain services or applications may have default privacy settings which, un-
less altered by the user, might indicate that they have consented to the collection,
use or disclosure of personal information. In the Facebook Complaint, the Assistant
Privacy Commissioner of Canada was prepared to accept the expedient use of some
default settings, presumably as a proxy for consent. Nevertheless, she tied the legit-
imacy of the choice of defaults to “whether the default privacy settings meet the
reasonable expectations of Facebook users.”125 By contrast, the EU Working Party
on geolocation services expressed the view that default settings should not be inter-
preted as consent. They wrote: “If the default settings of an operating system would
allow for the transmission of location data, a lack of intervention by its users should
not be mistaken for freely given consent.”126
Consent issues may also arise where End User Licence Agreements (EULAs)
or other standard form contracts contain clauses which provide that consumers who
“agree” to the terms of the EULA consent to the collection, use or disclosure of
their personal information. This may be particularly problematic in the context of
privacy policies displayed on mobile devices, where it may be necessary to scroll
through a large number of screens in order to view the entire policy.127 The FTC
specifically recommends that “[c]ompanies that provide services on mobile and
other “small screen” hand-held devices should determine how best to ensure that
consumers can access and review pertinent information about data practices.”128
123 PIPEDA, supra note 93, Schedule 1, clause 4.3.4. See also: Randall v. Nubody’s
Fitness Centres, 2010 FC 681.
124 PIPA (B.C.), supra note 93, s. 8(1)(a). Note that this provision at s. 8(1)(b) also re-
quires that “the individual voluntarily provides the personal information to the organi-
zation for that purpose”. A comparable provision is found in s. 8(2) of PIPA (Alberta),
supra note 93. See also PIPEDA, supra note 93, Schedule 1, clause 4.3.5. Principle
4.3.5 refers to the reasonable expectations of the individual, and gives the example of
the need to use subscriber name and address in order to deliver a magazine
subscription.
125 Facebook Complaint, supra note 105 at para. 89.
126 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 14.
127 Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 70-71.
128 Ibid at 71.
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The EU Working Party provides that “consent cannot be obtained freely through
mandatory acceptance of general terms and conditions, nor through opt-out pos-
sibilities.”129 However, Canadian courts have found standardized form contracts
sufficient to reflect a consumer’s consent to certain disclosures of personal infor-
mation.130 This is in spite of the fact that standard form privacy policies have be-
come notoriously lengthy and difficult to read131 and offer consumers few, if any
real choices. Consent is thus compromised both because it is not sufficiently in-
formed, and because it may not be truly voluntary.132 The FTC has observed that:
“Too often, privacy policies appear designed more to limit companies’ liability
than to inform consumers about how their information will be used.”133
Once consent is given, it may be appropriate to seek renewal of that consent,
especially where information is automatically provided by the consumer on an
ongoing basis. This might be the case, for example, where a mobile device regu-
larly and repeatedly communicates its location over the life of the device.134 Where
privacy policy terms change, during the course of the relationship between the con-
sumer and the company, fresh consent to the new terms should be obtained, and
this should be done in a transparent manner. For example, the FTC suggests that
“before making material changes to their data policies, companies should make
prominent disclosures that clearly describe such changes, and should obtain con-
sumers’ affirmative consent.”135
PIPEDA and its provincial counterparts all foresee certain circumstances in
which collection, use or disclosure of personal information can be made without an
individual’s knowledge or consent.136 These may include circumstances in which
129 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 14.
130 Gomboc, supra note 3. See also R v. Cuttell, 2009 ONCJ 471, [2009] O.J. No. 4053
[Cuttell], R v. Vasic (2009), 185 C.R.R. (2d) 286, [2009] O.J. No. 685 (Ont. S.C.J.)
[Vasic]; R v. Ward, 2008 ONCJ 355 [Ward] and R v. Wilson (February 10, 2009), Doc.
St. Thomas 4191/08 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Wilson]. While it is true that these cases are in the
criminal context, and deal with whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy for
constitutional privacy purposes, the courts nevertheless did find that the existence and
terms of the standard form contracts (which indicated that personal information could
be provided to law enforcement officials without notice or consent) were sufficient to
negate the customer’s reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal information.
131 See, e.g., Felicia Williams, Internet Privacy Policies: A Composite Index for Measur-
ing Compliance to the Fair Information Principles, (2006) at 17-18, online:
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071010feliciawilliams.pdf>.
132 Note that Canadian data protection statutes require that consent to the collection, use or
disclosure of personal information not be made a condition of receiving goods or ser-
vices, beyond what is required in order to provide the goods or services. See, e.g.:
PIPA (B.C.), supra note 93, s. 7(2); PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93, s. 7(2); PIPEDA,
supra note 93, Schedule 1, clause 4.3.3.
133 Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 19.
134 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 15-16.
135 Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 69.
136 Section 7(1) of PIPEDA, supra note 93, details the limited occasions in which it would
be “inappropriate” to require the individual’s knowledge and consent: a) the collection
is clearly in the individual’s interests and consent cannot be obtained in timely way; b)
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an individual’s life is in jeopardy. For example, a service provider might disclose
information about the location information on a user’s mobile device if it is sus-
pected that the user is in a situation of peril and requires assistance.137 Many of the
exceptions to consent relate to law enforcement, court orders, debt collection or the
administration of laws.138 These provisions raise the possibility that a court may
order, in the context of civil litigation, the disclosure of an individual’s location
information considered relevant to some aspect of the litigation.139 There are also
exceptions to consent requirements for journalistic activities,140 and publicly avail-
able information.141
A fourth principle relates to limitations on the collection of personal informa-
tion. Organizations are required to limit their collection of information to what is
reasonable for the purposes that they have specified. This principle introduces a
reasonableness concept which is complementary to that in s. 3 of PIPEDA. Section
3 limits the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by organizations
to “purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circum-
stances.”142 Thus the collection, use or disclosure of personal information must be
for reasonable purposes, and must be limited to what is reasonable to meet those
purposes.143 Canadian courts have emphasized the compromise nature of data pro-
tection legislation. In a recent Federal Court decision, Mainville J. stated: “PIPEDA
is a compromise between competing interests, and its provisions must be inter-
it is reasonable to expect that the collection with the individual’s knowledge or consent
would compromise the information’s accuracy or availability and the collection is rea-
sonable for investigating legal breaches; c) the collection is only for journalistic, artis-
tic or literary purposes; or d) the information is publicly available. Information that is
publicly available is specified in the regulations: Specifying Publicly Available Infor-
mation, Regulations, SOR/2001-7.
137 PIPEDA, supra note 93, ss. 7(1)(a), 7(2)(b), 7(3)(e); PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93, ss.
14(a), 17(a), 20(a), (g); PIPA (B.C.), supra note 93, ss. 12(a), 15(a), 18(a), (k).
138 PIPEDA, supra note 93, ss. 7(3)(c.1), 7(3)(c), 7(3)(b); PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93,
ss. 4(3)(c); 14(b), (c.2), (i); s. 17(b), (d), (j); s. 20(b), (f), (i); PIPA (B.C.), supra note
93, ss. 3(2)(b); 12(j), (e); s. 15(j), (e); s. 18(e), (g), (i), (j).
139 See, e.g.: Kocsis v. Kocsis (July 14, 2005), Doc. Barrie 209-05 (Ont. S.C.J.).
140 PIPEDA, supra note 93, s. 4(2)(c), s. 7(1)(c); PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93, s. 4(3)(c);
PIPA (B.C.), supra note 93, s. 3(2)(b). See Teresa Scassa, “Journalistic Purposes and
Private Sector Data Protection Legislation: Blogs, Tweets, and Information Maps”
(2010) 35 Queen’s LJ 733.
141 PIPEDA, supra note 93, ss. 7(1)(d), 7(2)(c.1), 7(3)(h.1); PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93,
ss. 14(e), 17(e), 20(j); PIPA (B.C.), supra note 93, ss. 12(e), 15(e), 18(e). Each statute
specifically defines information that is available to the public. It typically includes pub-
lic directory and registry information.
142 PIPEDA, supra note 93, s. 3. PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93, s. 2(b), defines reasona-
bleness as “what a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances”.
143 The provincial data protection statues combine these requirements in an explicit norm.
See, e.g.: PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93, s. 11. The Preliminary FTC Report, supra
note 56 at 45-46, also talks about limiting data collection to only that information nec-
essary to fulfill a specific business need.
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preted and applied with flexibility, common sense and pragmatism.”144 In a deci-
sion under Alberta’s PIPA, the majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal indicated
that the “reasonableness” standard required a recognition of the twin underlying
considerations of the Act. According to the Court, these are “the rights of the indi-
vidual to a reasonable level of privacy, and the needs of organizations to make
reasonable use of information on the conduct of their activities.”145 In expressing
this view, the majority also indicated that this balance of rights did not require
companies to adopt a “minimalist” approach to data collection.146
A fifth principle similarly places limits on the use, disclosure and retention of
personal information, requiring that any such use or disclosure be for the specified
purposes for which consent was given.147 Under PIPEDA personal information
shall be retained only as long as necessary for the fulfilment of the specified pur-
poses. As data collection expands, and as data security breaches become increas-
ingly common and potentially devastating, much greater attention has been given to
the issue of data retention.148 In the context of location-based information, while it
may be important for mobile device providers to collect this information to allow
144 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Canada (Privacy Commissioner),
2010 FC 736 at para. 101.
145 Leon’s Furniture Ltd. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2011 ABCA
94 [Leon’s] at para. 38. See also a comparable view on the twin purposes of PIPEDA in
Englander v. Telus Communications Inc., 2004 FCA 387, [2005] 2 F.C.R. 572 at para.
46.
146 Leon’s, supra note 145 at para. 38. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is
being sought. In general, data protection commissioners have taken a firmer line in
limiting the collection of data to reasonable purposes and to the extent reasonable for
those purposes. See, for example, See, for example: Cruz Ventures Ltd (cob Wild
Coyote Club)(Re), [2009] BCIPCD No 16, online: <http://www.
oipc.bc.ca/PIPAOrders/2009/OrderP09-01.pdf>; PIPEDA Case Summary #396, [2008]
SCCPVPC No 9, online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2008/396_20080227_e.cfm>;
Penny Lane Entertainment Group v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner),
2009 ABQB 140, [2009] A.W.L.D. 2633 (Alta. Q.B.).
147 Of course, statutory exceptions also apply to the general requirement of consent to use
or disclosure. Such exceptions permit information to be used or disclosed without con-
sent for other purposes (such as law enforcement, debt collection, or the administration
of laws).See, for example, PIPEDA, supra note 93, s. 7(2) and (3).
148 In her report of an investigation into the security, collection and retention of personal
information: TJX Companies Inc/Winners Merchant International LP, (25 September
2005) online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2007/tjx_rep_070925_e.cfm>, the Assistant
Privacy Commissioner of Canada was critical of the companies’ collection of excessive
amounts of personal information and of the retention of this information for an unnec-
essarily long period of time. See also: Jeremy Warner, “The Right to Oblivion: Data
Retention from Canada to Europe in Three Backward Steps”, (2005) 2 UOLTJ 75,
online: <http://www.uoltj.ca/articles/vol2.1/2005.2.1.uoltj.Warner.75-104.pdf>; Jean-
François Blanchette & Deborah G. Johnson, “Data Retention and the Panoptic Society:
The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness”, (2002) 18 The Information Society 33. Data
retention is also addressed by the Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 47, where
it writes: “businesses should promptly and securely dispose of data, including paper
and electronic records, for which they no longer have a specific business need”.
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the mobile device to function quickly and efficiently, it is not clear that it is neces-
sary to retain this information for any significant period of time.149 For example,
one of the “fixes” proposed by Apple, in the wake of the uproar over the collection
of location information via the iPhone 4 was to ensure that such information is only
stored for short periods of time.150 Because location information may have signifi-
cant commercial value to data profilers and mobile marketers, the interest in retain-
ing this information for longer periods of time with a view to selling it for other
purposes may be high. However, such practices put consumers at risk, and might
well contravene data protection laws. The FTC specifically notes that location-
based data should not be retained for longer than is necessary because of the
heightened risk to privacy posed by the sensitive nature of this information.151
Organizations are required to be transparent about their policies and practices
with respect to personal information. Although transparency requires the communi-
cation of information about an organization’s policies, it may also require that such
information be communicated in an accessible manner. In its recently released Pri-
vacy Framework, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission linked the value of trans-
parency to clear, shorter and more standardized privacy policies.152 The FTC also
suggested that mechanisms that permit consumers to compare data practices of dif-
ferent companies would enhance both transparency and competition with respect to
privacy protective measures.153
Data protection norms also require organizations to ensure that personal infor-
mation that they collect is “as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for
the purposes for which it is to be used.”154 A related principle is that of access;
individuals have a right to access their personal information in the hands of private
sector organizations, and to request that any inaccurate or incomplete information
be amended. The EU Working Party on geolocation services expressed the view
that when providing access to individuals’ geolocation information, companies
should ensure it is in “human readable format”, with specific geographic locations
rather than making reference to the numeric identifiers or coordinates.155 The ac-
cess principle also requires organizations to indicate, to the extent possible, those
other organizations to which it has disclosed the individual’s personal information.
Organizations must also ensure that they have sufficient safeguards in place to
protect the personal information of individuals. The more sensitive information is,
the greater the obligation to protect that information.156 Location information, par-
ticularly where it shows a pattern of activity over time, is likely to be considered
149 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 19.
150 Joelle Tessler, “Senate panel grills Apple, Google on location data”, Bloomberg
Businessweek (10 May 2011) online: <http://www.businessweek.com/ap
/financialnews/D9N4ONJ01.htm>.
151 Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 47.
152 Ibid at 41.
153 Ibid at 69.
154 PIPEDA, supra note 93, Schedule 1, clause 4.6.
155 Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 18.
156 See for example, Preliminary FTC Report, supra note 56 at 45; and PIPEDA, supra
note 93 Schedule 1, clause 4.7.2.
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highly sensitive, and companies that collect this information will have strict obliga-
tions to ensure its security. Obligations in this regard relate to security measures to
protect the information in the hands of the organization (such as encryption,
firewalls, or other security measures), as well as obligations to ensure its safe de-
struction once the need for the information has come to an end. There have been
enough high-profile data security breaches in recent years to provide heightened
scrutiny of these issues. The Alberta private sector data protection legislation was
amended in 2009 to include data security breach notification provisions,157 and
proposed amendments to PIPEDA in the late Bill C-29 would also have imposed a
limited data security breach notification obligation on organizations governed by
that law.158 On May 4, 2011, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
issued a press release calling on the government to reintroduce a much stronger
data security breach notification obligation, and to give the Commissioner the
power to impose significant fines on companies in the case of significant
breaches.159
Enforcement of obligations under private sector data protection legislation has
become an increasingly important issue in recent years, particularly under PIPEDA.
In the first place, there may be significant jurisdictional hurdles to overcome in
dealing with complaints. In many cases where location-based services are con-
cerned, the companies engaged in the collection, use or disclosure of personal in-
formation may be located in a different country — often the United States. Ques-
tions have been raised about the ability of the federal Privacy Commissioner to
initiate investigations against such companies. In Lawson v Accusearch Inc,160 the
Federal Court ruled that, where there was a sufficient connection to Canada, the
Privacy Commissioner had the jurisdiction to investigate. In that case, the Com-
plainant was Canadian and her personal information had been collected, presuma-
bly from Canadian sources, and disclosed in Canada by a company based in the
United States. The court concluded that “PIPEDA gives the Privacy Commissioner
jurisdiction to investigate complaints relating to the transborder flow of personal
information.”161 That being said, the court acknowledged that there might be sig-
nificant barriers to the investigation, particularly where the foreign-based company
declined to co-operate. Some of these difficulties might be overcome through the
use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with other countries, or other memoranda
of understanding.162
157 The amendments were in Bill 54: Personal Information Protection Amendment Act,
2009 which received third reading on November 18, 2009 and which came into force
on May 1, 2010.
158 Bill C-29, supra note 118, ss. 10.1–10.3.
159 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, News Release, “Fines Needed to Help
Stem Growing Data Breaches, Privacy Commissioner Says” (4 May 2011), online:
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2011/nr-c_110504_e.cfm>.
160 2007 FC 125, [2007] 4 FCR 314 [Lawson].
161 Ibid at para. 51.
162 Steve Coughlan et al, “Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing Extraterritorial Juris-
diction in the Age of Globalization” (2007) 6 CJLT 29 at 46. Following the decision in
Lawson, supra note 160, the OPC proceeded with its investigation of Accusearch. It
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The investigation into the complaint against Facebook offers an interesting ex-
ample of what can be achieved even absent the powers to physically investigate a
company based in another country or to compel the production of documents. In
that case, California-based Facebook chose to voluntarily cooperate with the Pri-
vacy Commissioner’s investigation. Perhaps more importantly, the company took
steps to implement the recommendations which flowed from the investigation. Ab-
sent this level of cooperation, it would have been necessary for either the Commis-
sioner or the Complainant to take the matter to federal court for a court order.
Whether any such order, if obtained, would have been enforced against the com-
pany by a U.S. court is an open question.
Not all companies based outside of Canada are likely to cooperate to the same
extent as Facebook should they face an investigation by the OPC. Indeed, the
Facebook complaint was strategically well chosen because the company was large,
high profile, and had a high volume of Canadian-based users. Smaller companies
will be much less concerned about any possible media backlash against them, and
may not have a significant enough base of Canadian users to make cooperation
worth their while.
Trans-border issues are not the only challenge for the enforcement of data pro-
tection laws in Canada. Although the provincial private sector data protection stat-
utes provide the relevant provincial commissioners with binding order-making
powers, the Federal Privacy Commissioner has no such authority under PIPEDA.
Instead, the OPC is limited to playing the role of an ombudsperson, and merely
issues findings and recommendations.163 Where a company ignores the recommen-
dations, either the complainant or the Privacy Commissioner may take the matter to
Federal Court.164 A complainant may also apply to Federal Court for a remedy that
may include monetary compensation.165 This two-stage process at the federal level
is time-consuming, and also places significant costs on the individual complainant.
The cumulative effect is that the enforcement mechanisms for PIPEDA are weak.
The shaming of companies who have engaged in poor information handling
was evident from the report of findings in this case that without the assistance of the
FTC, which was engaged in its own concurrent investigation of Accusearch, little
would actually have been learned about the company’s activities. See: Commissioner’s
Findings — PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-009: — Complaint under PIPEDA against
Accusearch Inc., doing business as Abika.com — July 31, 2009, online:
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_009_0731_e.cfm>.
163 For a critique of the ombuds model for data protection in Canada see: Christopher
Berzins, “Three Years Under the PIPEDA: A Disappointing Beginning” (2004) 3 CJLT
113; John Lawford, “Consumer Privacy Under PIPEDA: How Are We Doing?” (Ot-
tawa: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, November, 2004) at 13, retrieved from:
http://www.piac.ca/PIPEDAReviewFinal.pdf; Colin J. Bennett, “The Privacy Commis-
sioner of Canada: Multiple Roles, Diverse Expectations and Structural Dilemmas”
(2003) 46:2 Canadian Public Administration 218. See also: Jennifer Stoddart, “Cherry
Picking among Apples and Oranges: Refocusing Current Debate about the Merits of
the Ombuds-Model Under PIPEDA” (21 October 2005) online:
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/omb_051021_e.cfm>.
164 PIPEDA, supra note 93, ss. 14, 15.
165 Ibid, ss. 14, 16.
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practices may be a useful tool in encouraging compliance. While the provincial
privacy commissioners all disclose the names of respondent companies in com-
plaints, this is not done at the federal level, unless there are exceptional circum-
stances. This approach has been criticized as further undermining already weak en-
forcement mechanisms.166 While it is possible that PIPEDA reform may eventually
address some of these lacunae, it should be noted that apart from a new data secur-
ity breach notification requirement, significant enforcement reforms were lacking
in Bill C-29.
(b) The Intersection of Data Protection Laws with Constitutional
Privacy Norms
Location-based information is of great interest to law enforcement and na-
tional security officials in a wide range of contexts. Information that reveals an
individual’s movements over periods of time has frequently been important in
criminal and other investigations. Where such information is directly gathered by
law enforcement officials, warrants are typically required for anything other than
visual surveillance. In such a context, location information collected by private sec-
tor companies may be particularly attractive to law enforcement officials. Not only
can such information be detailed and fine-grained, it may also be historical (relating
to periods prior to the commission of a crime or prior to a warrant being sought).
Location-based information in the hands of third party organizations may also
be easier to access, as data protection laws may create possibilities for law enforce-
ment officials to seek this information from third parties without need for a war-
rant. For example, section 7(3)(c.1) of PIPEDA, as well as comparable provisions
in the private sector data protection statutes of British Columbia and Alberta167
permit organizations to disclose customer information to law enforcement officials
for investigation purposes without the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
The laws are permissive only — organizations are not required to disclose on re-
quest, and may insist upon a court order before disclosing. In a series of cases
under PIPEDA, courts have grappled with the relationship of section 7(3)(c.1) to
the right in section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be free
from unreasonable search or seizure.168 At the heart of these cases is whether the
permissive provisions obviate the need for a court order where organizations are
willing to provide the information on request. The jurisprudence is not settled, but
it would seem to turn on whether the accused had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the information.
The concept of the reasonable expectation of privacy is relied upon in the con-
stitutional privacy jurisprudence of both Canada and the United States.169 Essen-
tially, the state cannot be found to violate an individual’s privacy if that citizen did
166 Berzins, supra note 163; Bennett, supra note 163.
167 PIPA (B.C.), supra note 93, s. 18(1)(j); PIPA (Alberta), supra note 93 s. 20(f).
168 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter] s. 8.
169 See, for example: US v Katz, 389 US 347 (1967). In Canada, the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is central to an analysis of the s. 8 right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure. See, for example: Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145;
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not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. The reasonable
expectation of privacy has come under increasing pressure in our technological so-
ciety. It has been criticized by some for setting a standard which allows changing
technology and changing law enforcement or commercial practices to degrade pri-
vacy protection by simply undermining our expectations.170 The Supreme Court of
Canada has responded to this concern by stating that the reasonable expectation of
privacy should not depend upon the reasonableness of one’s expectations in a con-
text in which privacy is increasingly eroded by technologies of surveillance and
data collection. Instead, a court’s analysis should consider the balance between
one’s privacy interests and other compelling public interests.171
Where the subject matter of the search is information, courts apply an “infor-
mational privacy” analysis.172 Such analysis focuses upon “the thorny question of
how much information about ourselves and activities we are entitled to shield from
the curious eyes of the state.”173 Canadian courts have used a “spectrum” approach
as part of the informational privacy analysis, placing the “biographical core of per-
sonal information,”174 at the high end of the scale of protection. Core biographical
information was described in R v. Plant175 as information: “which individuals in a
free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination
to the state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate details
of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.”176 Location information
would clearly be core biographical information.177
Plant, supra note 3; R v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 [Tessling]; R v.
Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 [Patrick]; and Gomboc, supra note 3.
170 See, for example: James A.Q. Stringham, “Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered: A
Return to the Search for a Normative Core for Section 8?” (2005), 23 CR (6th) 245 at
251. Solove also discusses the social impact of the normalization of surveillance: see
Solove, supra note 86 at 35. Nissenbaum is also critical of the effects of practice and
convention on expectations of privacy. See Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual
Integrity”, (2004) 79 Wash. L. Rev. 119 at 144.
171 Patrick, supra note 169 at para. 14 and Tessling, supra note 169 at para. 42.
172 The Supreme Court of Canada has described informational privacy as those privacy
interests that lie “[b]eyond our bodies and the places where we live and work”; see ibid
at para. 23.
173 Ibid [emphasis in the original].
174 See Plant, supra note 3 at 293.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid at 293.
177 See, e.g., Working Party 13/2011, supra note 26 at 14. Some case law has made dis-
tinctions, in terms of the expectation of privacy, based on the precision or quality of the
information. This was certainly the case in both Tessling, supra note 169 at 29, and
Gomboc, supra note 169 at para. 40. In Tessling, the heat signature information was
considered to be usable only to draw inferences about possible activities within the
home. Similarly, four of the judges in Gomboc found that the data about the patterns of
electrical consumption was useful only to draw inferences. In the case of location infor-
mation, the particular positioning technology in use may be considered relevant. For
example, in one U.S. case, location information consisting of the individual’s position
based on the nearest cell phone tower was considered to be sufficiently imprecise as
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A key factor in the contextual analysis of the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information which is set out in R v. Tessling,178 and which was considered
by the Supreme Court of Canada most recently in R v. Gomboc,179 is whether the
information gathered by the police was in the hands of a third party, and if so, what
were the expectations of confidentiality related to that information. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has ruled that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,”180 and the Supreme Court of
Canada in Plant181 similarly found a very much diminished expectation of privacy
in information in the hands of third party service providers.
It is at this point that the intersection of data protection legislation and the
reasonable expectation of privacy is most explicit. As noted above, data protection
legislation expressly contemplates that third parties will collect data from data sub-
jects, and the terms and conditions upon which such collection will take place. Typ-
ically a company will have a privacy policy that explains how customer informa-
tion will be handled. In Section 8 Charter cases involving police access to
information in the hands of third parties, privacy policies have been treated by
courts as setting the boundaries for the reasonable privacy expectations of consum-
not to raise constitutional privacy concerns. In Matter of Application of US for an Or-
der, 411 F Supp 2d 678, 682 (WD La 2006). See also In re Application of the United
States For An Order For Disclosure of Telecommunication Records And Authorizing
the Use of A Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F.Supp.2d 435, 449-450 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). An opposite conclusion was reached in In Re Application Of The United States
For An Order For Prospective Cell Site Location Information On A Certain Cellular
Telephone, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 11747 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), online:
<http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/celltracking/SDNY_cell_site_II_denial.pdf>. How-
ever, these cases can be contrasted with the Ontario Superior Court’s decision in R. v.
Mahmood (2008), 236 C.C.C. (3d) 3 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons [2009] O.J. No.
3192, 194 C.R.R. (2d) 180 (Ont. S.C.J.) where the data collected from cell phone tow-
ers about thousands of users within the area, was relatively imprecise beyond indicat-
ing that those individuals were in the particular area within a key window of time. The
court nevertheless found that police trawling through this data was privacy invasive. Of
course, as noted earlier, the technological trend is towards increasingly accurate loca-
tion information. The presence of GPS chips in an increasing number of mobile de-
vices, for example, means that the precision of location data obtained from cell phone
use will inevitably be enhanced. Courts must be wary of location information prece-
dents based on older forms of technology offering inferior data quality.
178 Supra note 169.
179 Supra note 3.
180 Smith, supra note 3. More recent U.S. case law suggests that when it comes to records
of movements in the hands of service providers, the situation is unsettled. In In the
Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing a
Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government,
supra note 3, the motions judge found that citizens had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their location and movements as recorded in cell phone usage information.
This decision was reversed by the court of appeals, which found that it cannot be as-
sumed that cell phone records will automatically amount to tracking data that extends
into the private realm of the home. (620 F 3d 304 (3d Cir Pa 2010)).
181 Plant, supra note 3.
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ers. For example, where a privacy policy explicitly states that the information col-
lected by the company may be shared with law enforcement officials without the
knowledge or consent of the data subject, courts have been willing to find that the
data subject has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information when it is
disclosed in accordance with the terms of the policy.182 This view is based on the
idea that the consumer has consented to the terms of the privacy policy, and thus
cannot be surprised if such information sharing actually takes place. Of course, this
is all premised on notions of consent. As noted above, serious issues arise regarding
consent to terms found in standard form contracts, default settings and the like.
Unfortunately, if such consents are considered valid in the data protection realm,
there may be relatively little protection for customer information. In Gomboc, the
Supreme Court of Canada was split as to whether an obscure regulation governing
electrical utilities that required customers to opt out of voluntary data sharing with
authorities, could negate any expectation of privacy in customer data. A majority of
judges was of the view that it was either determinative, or was a relevant factor to
consider. Privacy policies, so seldom read by consumers,183 may thus play a key
role in determining their reasonable expectation of privacy vis à vis law enforce-
ment officials in their location information.
When dealing with information as highly personal as location information, the
presence of a clause in a service provider contract that states that information may
be shared with police without the customers notice or consent should not be treated
as sufficient to automatically eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy. Where
such clauses are buried in privacy policies attached to standard form contracts, they
may simply have never been read by the consumer. Further, in contracts where the
customer has limited or no bargaining power, or where there are few other service
alternatives, such clauses should not be used to obviate a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information as sensitive as one’s movements and activities.
The vastly increased amounts of data captured by service providers in the in-
formation age may be injecting more nuances into these discussions. As McLaugh-
lin notes, the rise of mobile marketing and the decline of data storage costs may
both contribute to the retention of a high volume of relatively fine grain location
information.184 An arguable case can be made that this should heighten judicial
concerns about privacy with respect to this information.
IV. TECHNOLOGICAL PRIVACY PROTECTION
Numerous technological measures have been advanced to solve privacy issues
associated with location-based technologies. Some of these mechanisms offer com-
plete protection of personal data, while others offer merely partial protection, but a
182 See, e.g., Ward, supra note 130; Cuttell, supra note 130; Vasic, supra note 130; and
Wilson, supra note 130.
183 “Average privacy policy takes 10 minutes to read, research finds”, OUT-LAW News
(June 2008) online: <http://out-law.com/default.aspx?page=9490>.
184 See Kevin McLaughlin, “The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking:
Where Are We” (2007) 29 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 421 at 432; Information &
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Privacy by Design, online:
<http://www.privacybydesign.ca>.
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combination of methods can be used as well to ensure the desired level of security.
Increasingly, privacy by design is being recommended as a means by which com-
panies can take steps, at the design stage, to incorporate privacy values and features
into their products and services.185 While privacy by design is not a complete or
necessarily unproblematic solution to privacy concerns, technology can offer some
options to consumers.
In the context of location-based services, privacy by design would mean that
systems and processes are designed to only receive the information needed in order
to efficiently process the user’s request. Further, such processes may strip identifi-
ers from information if these are not necessary to the process. In this way, a balance
may be maintained between the needs of the location-based service provider and
consumers’ privacy interests.
(a) Existing solutions
Some companies embed privacy management tools within their devices and
services. This allows individuals to manage their location data and to control the
amount of information that is disclosed to third parties. For example, one can
choose to only reveal general location information, such as country, or elect to di-
vulge further details, such as city or street.186 These measures are appropriate in
certain contexts. For instance, a postal code is sufficient to provide the user with a
list of Italian restaurants in the area. However, in many cases, in order to provide a
truly interactive and practical service, the user would have to disclose more than
just general location data.
Pseudonymization is a technique that has been employed to protect privacy.
The user’s location is associated with a pseudonym, rather than an actual name.
However, this method proved to be flawed, as it quickly became evident that other
identifying information such as the user’s residence or workplace could easily be
discerned with minimal background information about the user.187 Alternatives to
pseudonymization have been researched and advanced in the last few years. Their
main goal is to find ways to protect the association between the user and her private
information that could lead to re-identification.188
(b) Proposed Solutions
To respond to the threats posed by location-based services to mobile users’
privacy, researchers have looked into mechanisms able to strip user’s location data
from any features that would reveal their identity.189 Several studies have shown
185 FTC, supra note 56 at 40-41. See also: Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: The Seven
Foundational Principles (January 2011) online: <http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/
resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf>.
186 Bellavista, supra note 35 at 88.
187 Ibid.
188 C. Bettini et al, “Anonymity and Historical Anonymity in Location-Based Services”
2009 LCNS 55991 at 3, online: <http://www.springerlink.com/content/t4t
675126742/#section=185040&page=1>.
189 Ibid.
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that the separation between a user’s location data and her identification information
can be achieved through technological data protection methods such as location
anonymiser (K-anonymiser method), cryptographic techniques, obfuscation or
others.
(i) K-anonymiser
Location anonymiser method, or K-anonymiser, aims to ensure that the loca-
tion-based service, or an adversary that intercepts the communication between the
mobile user and the location-based service, cannot link the location data with a
specific user.190 In order to frustrate any attempts to infer the exact location of a
mobile user who placed the location-based query, a Location Anonymiser service, a
trusted third-party, will generate a “cloaking region” to mask the user’s location.191
The Location Anonymiser service retains the current location of all its subscribed
users. The cloaking region generated is then grouped with k number of requests
from multiple users, and all these requests are sent to the location-based service to
be processed at the same time.192 The value of k can be adapted to guarantee ano-
nymity.193 Where there are not enough requests from users, dummy requests can be
created to simulate additional users. The results generated by the location-based
service are sent back to the Location Anonymiser service where they are filtered,
and only the user’s desired result is sent back to her.194
The k-anonymisation method entails sending the query to the service provider
without any modifications. Where the query is for a highly specialized service, it
might provide context that could in turn lead to the re-identification of the user.195
Furthermore, if an adversary or the location-based service is aware of the value of
k, inferences might be drawn and the mobile user can be re-identified through an
elimination process.196 An added concern is posed by the Location Anonymiser’s
ability to store a set of requests issued by each mobile user and the sequence of her
location updates. This makes the private information stored on the trusted server
vulnerable to correlating attacks. Because the anonymisation method relies on a
trusted anonymiser system to function, this trusted system is a single point of at-
190 Shek, supra note 47 at 23.
191 Hasan et al, supra note 90 at 1.
192 See e.g. Shek, supra note 47 and Hasan et al, supra note 90.
193 For example, if user chooses in her options that k=5, the location anonymiser will for-
ward to the location-based service the user’s location and at least four more locations
from other. This ensures that the user’s location and her identity are not easily identifi-
able by the location-based service or an adversary.
194 Shek, supra note 47 at 23.
195 Hasan et al, supra note 90 at 1.
196 For example, if k=4, and the query is for a female hospital. If only one of the users
sending this query to the location-based service is a female, it is a simple inference that
it is that particular user who sent the query and re-identification is possible. For similar
scenarios regarding the dangers of k-anonymisation method, see Hasan et al, ibid at 2.
See also Bettini, “Protecting Privacy”, supra note 90.
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tack197 that could potentially lead to exposure of private information of users.198
(ii) Cryptographic Techniques
Cryptographic techniques make use of data encryption in order to conceal in-
formation regarding a user’s identity. For example, in place of a user’s identity data
being passed to the location-based service, a secure hash is sent along with the
user’s request. The location-based service will process the request without having
access to the identifying information of the mobile user.199 Because these crypto-
graphic techniques make use of sophisticated computational and application codes,
they are not yet suitable for use in low-powered mobile devices.
(iii) Obfuscation
Obfuscation is the process by which an individual can choose to degrade the
quality of information being sent to the location-based service, in order to protect
her privacy. The type of location information needed varies with different applica-
tions. For example, in order to receive current weather information, the application
only needs to know the city or postal code where the mobile user is located.
There are two ways to achieve deliberate imperfection in spatial information:
using inaccuracies or imprecision. Either one of these techniques can be used to
achieve obfuscation of a mobile user’s location.200 When using inaccuracies, the
location reported does not conform with reality, such as “X (the user) is in Que-
bec”, when in fact, X is in Ontario. Imprecisions make use of real information but
they do so in a way that makes it impossible to pinpoint the location with any
precision. For example, “X is in Canada”, is a true statement, but Canada is a large
country. A statement such as “X is in Eastern Canada” is still vague and still cannot
allow the location of X to be determined with any exactness, as there are no clear
boundaries of Eastern Canada.201
Imprecision of location has been identified as one of the best methods to ob-
fuscate the mobile user’s location, as it presents a number of advantages. This ap-
proach reveals to the location-based service just enough information to furnish the
desired response to the user. Obfuscation by imprecision is flexible and can be tai-
lored to reveal the true location information with the desired degree of precision
needed in specific contexts. This method allows for a direct connection between the
mobile user and the location-based service, without the need for an intermediary, as
is needed when using the k-anonymisation method.
197 Gabriel Ghinita et al, “Private Queries in Location-based Services: Anonymizers are
not Necessary” Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMOD international conference on
Management of data, (ii), 121at 121, online: <http://portal.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1376616.1376631>.
198 Hasan et al, supra note 90 at 1.
199 Shek, supra note 47 at 24.
200 See Matt Duckam et al, “A Formal Model of Obfuscation a Negotiation for Location
Privacy” in Pervasive Computing, 2005 LNCS 3468152 at 156, online:
<http://www.springerlink.com/content/kwlvm0de5mga8de2/fulltext.pdf>.
201 Ibid at 157.
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(iv) Access Control
Privacy can also be ensured by traditional access control mechanisms trig-
gered when certain conditions based on the user’s physical location are satisfied.
The user’s physical location is securely verified to meet particular criteria, and ac-
cess is granted to a service only when these criteria are met (e.g. user is in a spe-
cific zone, such as a shopping mall).202 The access granted to the service can also
be limited and controlled by privacy policies. For example, a user entering a large
shopping center may only want to receive advertisements and coupons related to
women’s clothing. She can set her preferences on the mobile device and, upon en-
tering the shopping center, only the desired types of advertisements are pushed to
the mobile device.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of location-enabled mobile devices in the hands of consum-
ers has led to a rapid development of location-based services. The collection, use
and disclosure of personal location information via these services raises serious pri-
vacy concerns, particularly given the sensitive nature of location information.
While data protection laws may impose limits on the collection, use and disclosure
of this information, there are gaps in the legislative framework, and in any event, a
complaint-driven approach alone is not sufficient to ensure adequate protection of
consumer privacy.
As with many other services delivered through wireless communications,
there are significant issues around how the consent requirements of data protection
legislation can be effectively met. The use of standard form contracts involving
multiple links and complex privacy policies is not an effective method to give no-
tice to consumers about the collection, use and disclosure of location information,
particularly given its sensitive nature. Similarly, default settings may undermine
privacy protection if they require consumers to opt into sharing by default. A busi-
ness culture that values more restrained collection, use and disclosure of personal
information, and shorter retention periods, will favour privacy protection and will
also limit the potentially devastating impact of large scale data breaches. Limited
collection and shorter retention periods will also reduce the scope of the impact of
increased reliance on data in the hands of private sector companies by law enforce-
ment officials.
It would be useful to see the development of guidelines, preferably in a co-
operative manner between federal and provincial privacy commissioners that ex-
pressly address the appropriate norms for notice and consent to data collection in
online and mobile environments. Such norms should consider requirements for re-
peated notifications where services are consumed on an ongoing basis for extended
periods of time. More work needs to be done as well on best practices in the draft-
ing of privacy policies that are accessible, easy to read, and ensure that consumers
are given realistic opportunities to be informed of the nature of any information
202 C.A. Ardagna & M. Cremonini, “Access Control in Location-Based Services” in Pri-
vacy in Location-based Applications, C. Bettinii et al, eds, (Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg, 2009) at 7-8, online: <http://spdp.dti.unimi.it/papers/Chapter5-
ACDS.pdf>.
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collection, and how their information will be used or disclosed by the service pro-
vider. Guidelines should also address the use of automated privacy settings.
Ultimately, more and better enforcement tools will also be required to allow
the federal privacy commissioner to add weight to the development of norms in this
area. The ability to name and shame data security breach notification requirements,
order-making powers and the ability to impose significant fines on companies
whose handling of personal information results in undue harm to consumers are all
important ways to ensure compliance with privacy norms.
Although location-based services may offer attractive and beneficial opportu-
nities to consumers, they do pose significant privacy risks. Because of the sensitive
nature of location information, these risks may translate into significant material,
moral and even physical harm. This is an area that calls for clear, proactive policy
guidance and strong enforcement measures. 
